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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
PETER McKELLAR, MARY HELEN PAR-
SONS, JAMES LESLIE McKELLER, 
CHARLES McKELLAR and GLEN Mc-
KELLAR, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs-
NELLIE McKELLAR, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case no. 
11456 
This action was initiated by the Appellants (Plaintiffs be-
low) against Nellie McKellar, Respondent (Defendant below) 
in an attempt to set aside a deed which was executed in favor 
of the Respondent and her deceased husband on May 5, 1947, 
and which was duly recorded at the Office of the Tooele · 
County Recorder. Appellants' action was based upon the 
theory that a mistake had been committed by the grantors of 
the property. The Respondent defended upon the grounds that 
the conveyance was valid and also on the ground that if a 
mistake had been committed, the Appellants were barred by 
the Statute of Limitations, Section 78-12-26 (3), Utah Code 
Annotated, 19 5 3, which limits the time for bringing an action 
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for fraud or mistake to three years. The Respondent counter-
claimed for summary judgment based upon this statute and 
also upon the ground that the Respondent had acquired rhe 
land under the "Adverse Possession Rule," pursuant to statute. 
The Appellants subsequently amended their complaint al-
leging that the mistake had been committed by a trustee and 
again the Respondent defended upon the grounds that an action 
to set aside a document based upon mistake or fraud was 
barred by the Statute of Limitations. 
DISPOSITION AT THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent moved for summary judgment in the Lower 
Court on the basis that no issues of law or fact remained to be 
determined by trial and the Lower Court granted the Re-
spondent's motion and quieted title to the property in the 
name of the Respondent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent seeks the affirmation of the Lower Court's 
judgment. 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
The Respondent is a sister-in-law of the Appellants. On 
December 17, 1942, Mary McKellar, the mother of the Appel-
lants and the of the Respondent's husband conveyed to two o± 
her children the land in dispute in this action. The deed from 
the mother to the two children was executed simultaneously 
with a separate agreement, which required the consent of two-
thirds of all of the children if and when the property was to 
be reconveyed, sold, transferred, or otherwise encumbered. The 
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deed from the mother to the two daughters was recorded at 
the Office of the Tooele County Recorder on August 20, 1945. 
The agreement between the mother and the two daughters 
which was executed simultaneously with the deed was recorded 
on January 25, 1951. 
On May 5, 1947, the two daughters, Mary Helen Parsons 
and Montella McKellar Dick, by Warranty Deed which re-
cited the consideration of Ten Dollars ( $10.00) conveyed to 
Frank McKellar and the Respondent, Nellie McKellar, as hus-
band and wife, the land in dispute in this action. Since that 
date, the Respondent and her husband, Frank McKellar, now 
deceased, have been ~.1 actual possession of said land and have 
fenced and improved the land by cultivation and have paid 
the taxes assessed by the Tooele County Assessor's Office. The 
Appellants brought an action twenty-one years after the con-
veyance in question, to set aside said conveyance from the 
two sisters to the Respondent and her deceased husband and 
base such action on the theory that a mistake had been com-
mitted by Mary Helen Parsons and Montella McKellar Dick 
in conveying the land in dispute to the Respondent and her 
deceased husband. 
The Respondent answered alleging that the conveyance 
was a bona-fide conveyance in that the Appellants released, 
consented to, and ratified the transaction between the two 
sisters and the Respondent and her deceased husband by a docu-
ment entitled "Release and Consent," dated June 20, 1953, and 
recorded July 3, 19 5 3, signed by all of the Appellants. More-
over, the Respondent affirmatively pled as a defense the Statute 
of Limitations for fraud and mistake pursuant to Section 78-
12-26 (3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, which limits the time 
for bringing an action for fraud or mistake to three years. As 
.m additional affirmative defense, the Respondent has pied the 
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seven years Statute of Limitations for adverse possession. The 
Respondent has further counter-claimed upon the adverse 
possession and at the hearing for the motion for summary judg-
ment introduced evidence as to its color of title and further 
showed that she had been in open and hostile possession for a 
period of twenty-one years and that the Respondent or her 
deceased husband had paid all of the taxes during those years 
and further fenced and improved the land by cultivation. 
RESPONDENT'S POSITION 
The Trial Court's judgment should be affirmed for the 
following reasons: 
( 1) The conveyance was a bona-fide conveyance 
since all of the Appellants released, consented to, and 
ratified the conveyance complained of. 
( 2) The Respondents obtained the land by adverse 
possession. 
( 3) The Appellants' action, based upon mistake, is 
barred by the Statute of Limitations pursuant to Sec-
tion 78-12-26 (3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONVEYANCE WAS A BONA-FIDE CON-
VEYANCE SINCE ALL OF THE APPELLANTS RE-
LEASED, CONSENTED TO, AND RATIFIED THE CON-
VEYANCE COMPLAINED OF. 
The pleadings show that there is no dispute as to the 
Warranty Deed between the mother and the two daughters or 
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as to the agreement which was executed simultaneously with 
that Warranty Deed, and there is no dispute as to the dates 
of the filing of said documents. Similarly, there are no disputes 
as to the Warranty Deed executed by the two sisters in favor 
of the Respondent and her deceased husband or the dates of 
filing of said document. 
The Respondent, at a hearing for its motion for summary 
judgment, introduced into evidence a document entitled "Re-
lease and Consent" which document was signed by all of the 
Appellants to this action, a part of which reads as follows: 
"Know All Men by the5c Presents 
That we, the undersigned being legal heirs of 
John M. McKellar, deceased, and Mary McKellar, de-
ceased, husband and wife, and being beneficiaries 
under the terms of that certain agreement between 
Mary McKellar, and Mary Helen McKellar Parsons, 
and Montella McKellar Dick, dated December 17, 
1942, and recorded Jmuary 25, 1951, in Book 'F' of 
Bonds and Agreements at Pages 9 3- 5, do hereby un-
conditionally consent and agree that Frank McKellar, 
a beneficiary, named in said agreement may proceed 
with the sale and conveyance of any and all real prop-
erty involved by the terms of said agreement or in-
volved in the Warranty Deed from Mary McKellar to 
Mary Helen McKellar Parsons and Mary McKellar 
Dick dated December 17, 1942, and recorded August 
20, 1945, in Book '4-A' of Deeds at Page 5 8 8 in Tooele 
County Recorder's Office, and in which any of the 
undersigned heirs of said deceased persons may have an 
interest. (Emphasis added) 
The "Release and Consent," a portion of which was 
quoted above, was signed by Mary McKellar Dick, Peter Mc-
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Kellar, Mary Helen McKellar Parsons, J. Leslie McKellar, Joseph 
G. McKellar, Charles A. McKellar, and Glen E. McKcllar, ar.d 
includes all of the Appellants who brought the present action. 
The release was properly executed, acknowledged, and notarized 
on June 3, 1953, and was recorded on July 3, 1953. 
It is obviously by the terms of that "Release and Consent" 
that at least two-thirds of the heirs released and consented to 
any and all conveyances of any and all of the lands described 
in the original deed which was .conveyed from the mother of 
the parties to the two daughtns and from the two daughters 
to the Respondent and her husband. Although prior approval 
may not have been obtained for the conveyance of the property 
from the two daughters to the Respondent and her husband by 
the "Release and Consent" cited above, all of the heirs and all 
of the Appellants ratified the conveyance and should be bound 
by such ratification. 
The Appellants argue, however, that either an actual or 
constructive trust was created although none of the documents 
in question or in evidence show any intent of appointing the 
Respondent or her deceased husband as alternative trustees for 
the rest of the heirs. In support of their contention, the Appel-
lants cite a statement of law relating to circumstances involv-
ing che wrongful conversion of property by the appointed fidu-
ciary. The Respondent was a bona-fide purchaser from the fidu-
ciaries in this case and if the terms of the trust agreement were 
not met in the first instance, the "Release and Consent" signed 
and recorded subsequently sufficed to correct any earlier de-
fects in the conveyance. The Respondent or her deceased hus-
band never <lcted in any fiduciary capacity for the other heirs. 
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POINT II 
THE RESPONDENT OBTAINED THE LAND BY 
ADVERSE POSSESSION. 
The Respondent by her counter-claim is entitled to have 
the property quieted in her through adverse possession. By her 
counter-claim, the Respondent pled that she has been in open 
hostile and adverse possession of the property in question for 
more than twenty-one years in that she and her deceased 
husband have paid the taxes pursuant to statute for the entire 
duration of their possession of the property. The pleadings show 
that the Respondent 1nd her deceased husband, by a convey-
ance deed and recorded in 1947 through possession of all of 
the land in dispute, and the evidence shows that the land was 
cultivated, improved, and protected by substantial enclosure 
during the twenty-one years that the Respondent owned said 
land. The Appellants have not provided any evidence to the 
contrary and should not now be heard to deny that the Re-
spondent obtained the ground in question by adverse possession. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANTS' ACT I 0 N, BASED UPON 
MIST AKE, IS BARRED BY THE ST A TUTES OF LIMIT A-
TIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 78-12-26 (3), UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
The Appellants' primary basis for this action is the theory 
th;it the land in question w;is conveyed to the Respondent and 
her deceased husband in ! 947 by mistake and that this mistake 
Was committed by :i trustee and the mistake should therefore 
be corrected by the Court not withstanding the passage of 
more than twenty-one years since the alleged mistake. 
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The Respondent's reply to the contention of mistake is that 
if a mistake had in fact been committed, the mistake had been 
ratified by all of the heirs by the document entitled "Release 
and Consent" heretofore referred to. Notwithstanding this 
"Release and Consent'', however, the Appellants' contention is 
without merit since the statute which bars an action based upon 
fraud or mistake if brought after three years does not 
distinguish mistakes committed by a trustee from mistakes 
committed by someone other than a trustee. 
Certainly, no such distinc-:ion was intended by the statute 
and the Supreme Court of Utah in Parr vs. Zions First National 
Bank, et al., 13 Utah 2d 404, 375 P. 2d 461, held that a Statute 
of Limitation is applicable and is effective in cases involving 
guardianship and trustees as well as persons acting in their 
own behalf. 
Appellants deny that the Statute of Limitations referred 
to is applicable in this case because they contend that the 
mistake was not known to them until a very short time before 
this action was commenced. The records contradict the Appel-
lants' contentions, however. 
The deed from the two sisters to the Respondent and her 
deceased husband was executed and recorded on May 5, 1947. 
The recording of the deed was sufficient under our statute to 
give all third persons notice of the conveyance and notice was 
at least constructively given to all of the Appellants by record-
ing. Our recording statute reads: 
57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart notice-
Operation and effect--lnterest of person not named 
in instrument.-Every conveyance of real estate, and 
every instrument of writing setting forth an agree-
ment to convey any real estate or whereby any real 
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estate may be affected, to operate as notice to third 
persons shall be proved or acknowledged and certified 
in the manner prescribed by this title and recorded in 
the office of the recorder of the county in which such 
real estate is situated, but shall be valid and binding 
between the parties thereto without such proofs, 
acknowledgment, certification or record, and as to all 
other persons who have had actual notice. Neither the 
fact that an instrument, recorded as herein provided, 
recites only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that 
the gr:mtee in such instrument is designated as 
trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise purports to 
be in trust without naming the beneficiaries or stating 
the terms of the trust, shall operate to charge any third 
person with notice of the interest of any person or 
persons not named in such instrument or of the 
grantor or grantors; but the grantee may convey the 
fee or such lesser interest as was conveyed to him by 
such instrument free and clear of all claims not dis-
closed by the instrument or by an instrument recorded 
as herein provided setting forth the name of the bene-
ficiaries, specifying the interest claimed and describ-
ing the property ch:lrged with such interest. 
Moreover, the Appellants were given actual notice in June 
of 1953 of the conveyance which they now complain of. The 
document entitled "Release and Consent" refers to "any and 
all real property" inYolved in the original deed between the 
mother and her two daughters and between the two daughters 
and the Respondent and her deceased husband. By signing that 
document, the Appellants admitted knowledge of the trans-
action complained of and indeed were given actual knowledge 
and notice. 
It is Respondent's contention that if in fact a mistake had 
been committed, the mistake was ratified by all of the heirs 
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by the "Release and Consent" signed by the Appellants and 
recorded at the County Recorder's Office. Furthermore, it is 
Respondent's contention that if a mistake had in fact been com-
mitted by the trustees and the mistake was not ratified by the 
heirs, the Appellants are still barred from bringing this action 
by the three-year Statute of Limitations. 
SUMMARY 
The Respondent submits that the Appellants' case is 
barred by the three-year Statute of Limitations for fraud and 
mistake, and further submits that the Respondent is entitled to 
have title quieted in her under the Adverse Possession Rule, 
and therefore the Lower Court's ruling should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KENNETH M. HISA TAKE 
Attorney for Respondent 
4 3 1 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
